Warning: This is a long one.
I’m doing my least favorite thing in the world right now, which is flying. To offset the six hours of anxiety I suffer on a cross-country trip, I’m a little wacked out on an anti-anxiety sedative that has effect of increasing the time it takes thoughts to get from my brain pan to my fingers by about 30%. It also seems to be affecting my typing skills. No matter. I will rise to the challenge of better articulating why we should all be concerned about the reaction to the current economic crisis. Such reaction, in and out of government circles, centers on comprehensive regulation of all financial services firms of any size (although larger firms will be subject to more rules). The regulations proposed will be sweeping and touch nearly every aspect of the financial services world, from product development and product pricing, compensation, reporting standards, oversight standards (who reports to whom, and how), who can own what and how much of it…the list goes on.
In this post, I’ll attempt to address several good points brought up by others that have left comments on my prior post (Regulating Outcome). I don’t have the complete list in front of me, but I think I can shoot from the hip and get pretty close.
First, I want to get a couple things out of the way. One comment was from someone who said that what really chapped his ass was the attitude that all government employees are idiots and that they should get out of the way and let the “smart” people go to work on the problems. I never said this. I didn’t even imply this. What I did say is that the government is probably not the right place to look for the Right answers. This is a function of the backgrounds of the participants, the committee-like nature of every decision making process, the culture of government organizations, and the politicization of everything that the government touches. There are plenty of highly educated and very experienced people working in Washington on behalf of all of us, but very few have the skill and experience sets to understand and deal directly with what is going on right now in the economy. This is especially true of our elected officials, right up to the top. This isn’t a condemnation of our public servants; it’s a statement of fact supported by even the most cursory review of their backgrounds. It’s not all about the people. The system and its structure are rife with inefficiencies, conflicts, and perverse incentives. I’ll make a distinction from those who serve on the local levels versus the state and Federal levels. More detail on all this later.
Mea Culpa time: senior business leaders in all industries, not just financial services, fucked up big time. They ignored fundamental tenets of risk management and manageable growth. What’s more, everyone could see what was coming. Of course, no one knew exactly when it would happen, but on all measures, we were operating so far above the mean trendline that it had to snap back. Remember this if you take nothing else out of what I write, “Everything regresses to the mean”. The questions are, “How did this happen?”, “Who’s to blame?”, and “What can be done to mitigate this activity in the future?”. In short, “Could regulation have prevented this and, if so, what type?”. Maybe the most important question to be asked is, “Even if what they did was stupid, did they act rationally?”.
There was some malfeasance and unfair dealing, but that actually represents a very small percentage of the current goat rodeo. Madoff, Stanford, Lay (Enron), Kowalski (Tyco) are truly bad dudes who burned off a lot of other people’s money, but in the greater scheme of things, the actual damage wasn’t nearly a large as the press they received. It was truly bad activty and it needed to be addressed, but that’s not why we are where we are. Also, let’s not forget that it takes complicity on both sides of a transaction to get it to work. Complicity can take the form of active fraud or it can take the form of reduced due diligence and investigation on the part of the buyer. More on this later, too.
The U.S. economy, really the world economy, is working off a bubble. It’s a valuation bubble that started with residential housing, spread into commercial real estate, and ended up impacting company valuations late in the game. Bubbles are nothing new: tulips in Western Europe, the South Sea Company (South Sea Bubble), railroad stocks in the U.S., tech/internet companies in the late 1990s. All of these bubbles enriched people as they grew and then suddenly popped when the market decided that the system contained too much poison. The bubbles were painful as they unwound.
What did all these bubbles have in common: excessive and cheap liquidity, financing speculation to drive up prices to levels unsustainable by actual market supply/demand dynamics and intrinsic value. There is a huge psychological component to bubbles, but they simply can’t exist without excessive and cheap financing. In every case in history where a bubble has existed, the ability to borrow money cheaply and in great quantity has been central to the growth of that bubble. The price of money is not allowed to float freely in response to supply and demand of currencies. In fact, it is tightly controlled by the central banks; the Federal Reserve in the U.S. For several administrations, our government, through its regulatory and controlling bodies, has actively managed interest rates down and instituted a weak dollar strategy, thereby pumping trillions of dollars of excess liquidity into the economy. Greenspan, in particular, was the architect of the Goldilocks Economy – attempting to manage liquidity so the economy neither got too hot nor too cold. The key point here is that government intervention caused the excess liquidity that allowed the creation of a bubble. This is past debate. Almost no serious economist would suggest otherwise. Greenspan himself publicly took responsibility for making mistakes trying to move the cost and availability of capital.
What was the focus of this increased liquidity and why? Residential real estate became the prime outlet. This was primarily due to the Community Reinvestment Act passed in the Carter administration (thanks Matt!) but accelerated in practice through the Clinton and Bush administrations (this isn’t a left/right thing…there is plenty of shit to cover both sides of the isle). The goal was admirable although somewhat arbitrary. The intent was to enable as many people as possible to own their own home. The decision was made that universal home ownership should be the state of equilibrium. This was affected by putting pressure on banks to write mortgage loans to borderline borrowers with interest rates lower than their credit histories would suggest in a completely free market. The only way that banks were going to write this paper was if they had someone to which they could sell the aggregated mortgages (mortgage backed securities, or MBS). The banks knew that these were not going to be good credits but they were prohibited from charging interest rates, fees, and down payments commensurate with the risks they were taking. The government required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two largest purchasers of pooled mortgages and securities, to buy MBS backed by sub-prime loans. A market is born.
This increased loan activity bubbled up the risk ladder and was applied to less risky borrowers but was provided on less stringent terms, such as 0% down, interest only (IO) loans with balloon payments, and so forth. The banks were happy to write this business because the spread between their borrowing costs and their lending costs was very high (remember the artificially depressed interest rates as a result of a hyper-liquid market). Not only were they being economically incented to write this business, the government was tracking the loans written to the worst credits and nudging banks that were falling behind. Government intervention in the market created a set of incentives for all market participants, not just the bankers but the consumers of mortgages, that made it easier for them to ignore common sense and risk management principals. Did we make mistakes? Definitely. Did we act rationally given the incentives? Probably. This is a clear case of rational behavior when the allure of the perverse incentives is greater than the negatives of doing the wrong thing because the honey is near term and the sting is abstract and longer term. Should we have known better? In a perfect world, yes. Welcome to the Law of Unintended Consequences.
The whole point of this is that the system is incredibly complex and there are literally billions of levers to pull. There is absolutely no way for any one individual, or even a group of the smartest, most highly educated people in the world, to effectively make decisions for the entire market. The Law of Unintended Consequences will always manifest itself, and the more complex the system, the more misguided the intervention and the worse the consequences will be. Well meaning government intervention in the free market (with an admittedly admirable goal of broadening home ownership) is directly responsible for the mess we’re in now. It’s not 100% responsible, but it played a major role. Without the excess liquidity produced by the Fed and without it being directed by the government into a market that couldn’t rationally absorb the capital, the housing bubble wouldn’t have happened and we wouldn’t be here today.
Let’s look at other cases of well intentioned government regulation that didn’t work out as planned. Sarbanes-Oxley is the major reason why the IPO market is a shadow of its former self. The goal of increased transparency is important and one that is critical to efficient, self-correcting markets. You know from prior posts that I put transparency at the top of the list of things we need to focus on to correct the system. The ham-handed structure of this regulation added so much cost to being a public company that no private company wants to go public. This has taken away a critical financing mechanism for growth of small, medium, and large businesses, and therefore growth of the economy (GDP, jobs, etc). It has squelched much more value creation the cost of the Enron disaster, to which it was a reaction.
The mark to market requirement is another regulation that blew up in our face. The theory is sound: take the ability to manipulate investment valuations away from the investment managers so that there is more transparency and accuracy in reporting, especially for those companies with significant balance sheet risk. I’ve had several people ask why this is a problem. If the mark to market valuations are down, doesn’t that prove that they were being overvalued on balance sheets and isn’t it better to know that now versus later. How can transparency be a bad thing? Second thing first. Transparency is never a bad thing in commerce. In fact, it is paramount. The problem is when the mark to market values do not reflect intrinsic value due to technical factors. This is what is happening now and is the straw that broke the camel’s back (see the Regulating Outcome post). The artificially depressed values of the securities in question don’t reflect the economic reality of the underlying assets, so the transparency is false. There is also a fundamental duration mismatch between daily or quarterly mark to market values for long-term securities with 10+ year lives. It’s just not a relevant valuation benchmark because no one would ever sell these securities at these values unless they absolutely had to (remember that the intrinsic value far exceeds the market value due to technical factors). But institutions are being forced to sell these securities at these artificially depressed values because they no longer have enough capital reserves as set by the regulators because they are forced to mark long-term assets to daily marks. This forced selling in a depressed market puts more downward technical pressure on the assets. You can see that it’s a vicious cycle. This is a very basic point and obvious to anyone in the investment management world. Ivory Tower accountants and the SEC regulators (at the urging of the Senate and House finance sub-committees) set the mark to market mandates without any discussion with market participants. If they had bothered to ask, they would have learned what a shit storm they were about to precipitate.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. That was another piece of well thought out, constructive regulation. 1,028 economists signed a document decrying this Act before it was instituted. The Senate, House, President, and all his advisors knew better. The world markets reacted, as expected, by raising tariffs against the U.S., ushering in the Great Depression. We ignore the market at our own peril.
Why is government regulation so consistently off the mark with its results when the government aims so carefully at its intended targets (many of which are worthy). I point to three areas: the decision making process, the culture of government, and the people. Let’s start with the culture. I said in a previous post that the people in the relevant governmental agencies don’t understand the game. My friend Matt took issue with this, stating that they understand the game all too well. I couldn’t disagree more. {Please note that these comments apply most directly to the state and federal governments. Local governments I’ve found to be pretty in tune with their constituency and much more sensitive to the budgeting issues because their budgets are so small.} The culture of government is one of provision. They decide who need or gets what and this is done in the absence of meaningful market feedback (the consumer, which is the ultimate regulator in a free market). They pay for that provisioning decision through levying taxes. It’s completely backwards. They decide what the costs are going to be first and then take the revenues. There is no profit and loss responsibility. They only cut back when they are forced to do so. It’s not a culture of growth, efficiency, and maximizing outcome. Government employees get paid the same whether they are the best at what they do or the worst. They do not live their professional lives in an environment where they lead by and respond to incentives, therefore, they don’t think through the long term impact of the decisions they make that get applied to a world that does. It’s a completely different mindset when your personal gains and losses are absolutely disconnected from your effort and the outcome of your decisions. They are products of their environment. If you have spent any time in a large government agency (I’ve spent some time with my state’s insurance commission) you know what I mean. That’s a problem when you start talking about heavy, pointed regulation in the free market. The Law of Unintended Consequences will rear its ugly head.
What about the people? Matt has argued that there are some incredibly smart people in government. He’s right. He specifically mentioned the President’s economic advisors, many of which are some of the most highly respected, recognized people in economics. These are also the same people that got us here by deciding how much money should be in the system, how much it should cost, and where it could serve the best purpose. Alan Greenspan is one of the most highly respected economists in the world, and he, more than any other, is the architect of the excess liquidity that we’re working through now. He has admitted this. I don’t care how smart you are or how much experience you have, no one person, no group of 100 people, can accurately forecast future needs for any economic input. The tools at the disposal of the Fed are way too blunt and the feedback loop on the decisions is too inaccurate and lags too long for the Fed to react appropriately, in terms of timing or scale. What you end up with is a whipsawing effect that increases in frequency and amplitude until the market takes matters into its own hands, begins to self-correct, trending back towards the mean, and pukes out the poisons that have been introduced into its system. Look at the last 10 years as support for this statement, as the market has tried to self-correct, only to be thwarted temporarily by government intervention in the money supply and active weakening of the dollar.
The President, his advisors, and the Fed are only one part of our governmental decision making system. Congress, and specifically the finance committees and sub-committees, are equally is important (and complicit). {These comments apply mostly to the Federal and state governments. Local government, in my experience, is largely comprised of people that are doing double duty (their day job plus a committee) or people like Town Planners that have extensive education and training in a specific function.} That fact is, most of our elected officials have zero background in economics, finance, or running a business. Lawyers by far outweigh business people in the Capitol. By and large these are not people that have had any responsibility for creating jobs, building a brand, creating a long-term strategic plan and tactically executing to that plan, building a business, managing employees, allocating scarce resources (mostly their own), or balancing the thousands of tradeoffs that come with running something real that actually creates something. They’ve gone to good schools but are educated in abstract disciplines. Most importantly, they lack significant real-world and hands-on experience.
I’m a pretty smart kid with lots of education and experience in economics and finance, but you wouldn’t want me directing the planning and zoning for your town. I may make decisions that seem sensible to me, but they will all be made in a vacuum, devoid of any experience or ability to forecast ramifications or repercussions. I don’t understand why our town has put a moratorium on cul de sacs. I think they’re safer and more desirable. When I raised this point with our town’s planner, I learned that there are actually several good reasons why cul de sacs and dead ends are not at all desirable from a town planning perspective. There is no substitute for experience and knowledge. Most of our elected officials and many of our appointed officials don’t have any direct experience in or knowledge of finance and economics.
The definitely don’t understand the specifics of the instruments and activities they’re trying to regulate. They don’t know a thing about collateralized debt obligations, mortgage backed securities, credit default swaps, capital reserves…the list goes on. They don’t know how they work, why they can be valuable, or how they can be destructive. They don’t understand how they’re valued or have any experience with the contracts. They haven’t spent any time living daily with any one of these highly complex issues, never mind all of them. How can they possibly effectively regulate them if they done know anything about them. They have absolutely no knowledge base from which to issue the types of specific regulatory mandates that are currently on the table. What information they do get is distilled by equally inexperienced aids that have neither the time nor expertise to provide detailed briefs. You need to understand the pieces if you’re going to regulate the pieces.
I question whether many Senators or Representatives on either side of the aisle really understand the whole, never mind the pieces. Did any of you see Barbara Boxer’s “interrogation” of Geithner a few weeks ago? She embarrassed herself with questions and the misuse of terminology that weren’t even remotely related to the issue she was trying to address. She asked Geither about “his CEO”. When he looked at her like she had two heads and said he didn’t understand the question, she accused him of getting bogged down in the details. She clearly has no knowledge of even the fundamentals of the banking system or the economy. Her rambling is on You Tube. Check it out. Chris Dodd, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, is equally clueless. Chris Murphy, a Representative from my home state and a friend of mine, is a 2nd year law associate that did a very good job supplanting a senior representative from her seat two elections ago. He knows absolutely nothing about the economy, finance, or running a business. He’s smart, a good kid, and his heart is in the right place, but he doesn’t understand how anything works, he only knows where he wants everything to end up. That is dangerous.
Matt also brought up the point that our officials as elected by the populace are the right people to make system-wide decisions, not business leaders who are self-interested and conflicted (my paraphrasing, mostly from memory; my apologies to Matt if I got this wrong in my Lorazapem induced haze). Our elected representatives in all branches are horribly conflicted and wrestle with these conflicts at every turn. The system strongly incents them to think short term and to respond to populist sentiment. People want instant satisfaction. In today’s environment, they want an instant solution to the economic woes. People aren’t interested in a long-term solution when they’re not working and can’t feed their families. Our elected officials are all too aware of this short term pressure. They rely on votes to keep their jobs. The have to get these votes every 2 to 6 years, depending on their position. Representative Murphy complained in the Hartford Courant last year that his fundraising for the next election began almost immediately after the election he just won. Fundraising means compromise. Within the Capitol, they consolidate power by swapping support for programs and bills. To compound the problem, each Senator and Representative represents a relatively small portion of the overall economy and population. Even if they were perfectly aligned with the needs of their specific constituency (which they are not), they would not necessarily be aligned with what’s best for the economy or the population as a whole. The political process almost guarantees that any policy that comes out of the sausage maker will result in inefficiency and unintended consequences. Look at military contract disbursements, base closures, public works disbursement, and all of the other pork projects that both Republicans and Democrats argue over and tell me that they have the entire country’s best interests in mind. They are concerned with keeping their positions through votes and bringing money into their districts or states, without regard to efficiency, effectiveness, or the impact on the whole. I don’t blame them for this. They are merely reacting to the incentives set in front of them. I’d probably do the same if I was in their position.
Finally, does anyone really think that our state and federal elected officials represent the best this country has to offer? They won a spending and marketing contest. They didn’t progress through a meritocracy. Obama is definitely not my guy, but frankly, McCain probably isn’t any more knowledgeable. Don’t get me started on Palin. While some appointees may have some relevant backgrounds, by and large they are political appointees and their position is the result of trading favors. Me, I’ll put my faith in transparent, efficient, free markets supported by strong contracts and full disclosure.
This may sound like I’m anti-democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Each of the individual units in our system of government has conflicts and flaws. Certainly, the individual participants do. The Founding Fathers understood this, and this is the genius and strength of what they established. The beauty of our system is that it, too, has mechanisms for self-regulation, checks and balances, and self-correction (over time). No matter what ideology is in favor, the system smooths out the rough edges, again over time. Someone once said that our system was created by geniuses to be run by idiots. Instead of idiots, I substitute “people that think they know more than they really do”.
A market economy is the ultimate form of democracy. Everyone has a vote and it counts directly, as opposed to our representative system. Unlike the representative system, the end user, the consumer, is directly involved real time and is the most powerful regulator (but this is only completely true in an environment of full disclosure and alignment of interests – see my closing comments). How can you not trust the market but trust our government, which is a decidedly less pure form of democracy? I find that position to be inconsistent.
What do you regulate and what limits do you set? How do you arrive at those limits? What are the possible consequences? Can we live with them? Are the regulations fine enough to fix the problem without unwanted impact? What will the market do to get around these regs and what impact will that have? What impact will these rules have on financial innovation, the cost of capital, or growth? Any hard limits that are set will be arbitrary and not effective in a highly diverse and dynamic world economy. All these things are interrelated. Highly structured financial instruments serve a valuable purpose in reducing the cost of capital, which in turn finances growth and lower consumer costs. Are we at risk of regulating these out of existence? Some rhetoric would suggest so. If you think things are bad now, wait until interest rates jump 5 points and become the new equilibrium point because there is no way to trade risk and arbitrage short and long term expectations..
Whenever a government, either through regulation, taxation, and spending, has diverted capital and resources to non-market choices, there has been long-term backlash. The further away from the market path we go and the longer we force it to stay there, the more violent the purging we can expect. The extreme deleveraging that has taken over the world economy is the market self-correcting despite the Fed’s best efforts. It is purging the system of excess liquidity and it is forcing saving. It is forcing valuations and consumption patterns back to the mean. It is rebalancing the supply and demand of both goods and money.
Where does this leave us? Clearly something has to change so that this won’t happen again. Unbridled capitalism is unlikely to result in a good outcome. This is Mercantilism, and history has shown that it is undesirable all the way around. Clear ground rules and enforcement are critical. The market needs to be put in a position to regulate itself and self-correct. I believe that this is best done by establishing and enforcing strong guidelines for disclosure, transparency, alignment of interests, and contracts. Sunshine is the best disinfectant. If people aren’t fully informed about what they are buying, that’s a problem because risks can’t be accurately priced. If people are fully informed and they misprice the risk, that’s ok and the cost of that mistake is an important component of individual decision making, market self-regulation, and correction. This transparency extends to full disclosure of asset ownership and consolidation of this reporting so that cross-ownership can be metered and fully understood. The market will price in the risks of this cross ownership and punish those institutions with higher costs of capital, forcing a real time disgorgement of the relevant assets. Financial institutions can’t be allowed to act solely as agents, taking a fee on securities but with no requirement to keep some of the risk that they packaged up and sold to others. If institutions are required to maintain balance sheet exposure to the securities they develop and sell, they will pay much more attention to the quality and risk profile of those assets. Compensation, up and down the organization, should be tied to company performance. Management having a meaningful ownership stake in their companies is an important incentive, but to truly align interests, they should be required to purchase shares at current market values with real cash instead of getting option grants at low prices that can be reset if the stock heads in the wrong direction. These are all basic standards that our government can institute that will have a meaningful, long term positive impact on our economic system. This approach will not have unintended consequences because we will not be trying to manipulate individual pieces in a highly complex system. We need to set up the right incentives (and disincentives), not try to regulate outcome. I believe this approach is our best chance of squelching unwanted behavior and mispriced risk taking while simultaneously increasing the efficiency of our economic system and rewarding smart risk taking and growth initiatives.